illl»liaillilllll!IIIIIIII!IH^^^^^^ 

I  GOV.  JOHN  P.  ALTGELD'S  | 

I  PARDON  OF  THE  ANARCHISTS  | 

I  AND  HIS  MASTERLY  | 

I  REVIEW    OF    THE  | 

I  HAYM ARRET    RIOT  | 

1  iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiy^  I 


RX]PRIl>7a?Sr>    FKOM    LIFE 
OF  ALBERT  R.  PARSONS 


LUCY  E.  PARSONS,  Publisher 

3130  NORTH  TROY  ST.,        CHICAGO,  ILL. 


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^*'*'*'^ir^niiiiii» " " 


Hllllllllllllllilllllllllllllllllll!!llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllliy^ 

GOV.  JOHN  P.  ALTGELD'S  ] 

t   PARDON  OF  THE  ANARCHISTS  | 

AND  HIS  MASTERLY  | 

REVIEW    OF    THE  | 

HAYMARKET    RIOT  | 

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiy^  I 


REPRINTED     FROM    LIFE 
OF  ALBERT  R.  PARSONS 


I  LUCY  E.  PARSONS,  Publisher  | 

I  3130  NORTH  TROY  ST.,        CHICAGO,  ILL.  ■ 

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PREFACE 

In  publishing  the  Pardon  of  Gov.  J.  P.  Altgeld,  I  am  actuated  by  the 
sole  desire  to  inform  the  public  generally,  and  the  present  generation 
particularly,  regarding  the   Anarchists '   case. 

The  men  who  were  hanged  in  Chicago  on  November  the  11th,  1887, 
the  Anarchists,  one  of  them  my  beloved  husband,  Albert  E.  Parsons,  were 
innocent  of  any  crime.     They  were  labor  organizers  of  rare   ability. 

Gov.  Altgeld  pardoned  the  three  men  who  were  confined  in  Joliet 
prison,  because  he  believed  their  conviction  was  the  result  of  the  mob 's 
demand,  although  the  "mob  was  clothed  in  purple  and  fine  linen,ii,from 
Gov.  Dunn's  speech  at  the  unveiling  of  Altgeld 's  statue,  in  Lincoln  Park, 
Chicago. 

Some  time  ago,  I  published  the  "Famous  Speeches  of  the  Chicago 
Anarchists,  in  reply  as  to  why  the  sentence  of  death  should  not  be  pro- 
nounced upon  them."  These  "Famous  Speeches"  have  met  with  a  large 
sale,  and  I  have  the  satisfaction  to  know  that  their  publication  has  done 
a  great  deal  to  enlighten  the  public  mind  as  to  the  conspiracy  and  the 
conspirators  who  sent  my  innocent  husband  and  his  comrades  to  the 
gallows.  As  my  life's  work  is  to  prove  their  innocence,  I  now  ask  the 
public  to  carefully  read  these  pages,  especially  as  Altgeld  had  been 
judge  before  he  was  elected  governor,  consequently,  he  could  examine  the 
Anarchists'  case,  with  a  calm,  clear,  discriminating  mind,  and  being  just 
and  honest,  he  pronounced  them,  "Not  Guilty,"  unconditionally  releasing 
the  three  men,  who  had  not  been  judicially  murdered.  For  this,  noble,  just 
and  humane  act.  Gov.  Altgeld  was  hounded,  abused,  ostracized,  and  boy- 
cotted, by  the  "mob  in  purple  and  fine  linen,"  until  he  lost  his  splendid 
property.  Unity  building,  and  other  holdings,  and  from  being  a  rich,  hon- 
ored citizen,  and  governor  of  the  great  State  of  Illinois,  "The  mob  in 
purple  and  fine  linen ' '  forced  him  to  die,  practically  a  pauper. 

Ten  years  after  his  death,  the  people,  the  plain  common  people,  as- 
sembled in  beautiful  Lincoln  Park,  and  with  uncovered  heads,  witnessed 
the  unveiling  of  the  grand  statue,  and  the  beautiful  group,  representing 
the  working  class,  the  class  from  whose  loins  the  governor  himself  had 
sprung,  and  who  in  his  days  of  exaltation,  he  never  forgot,  or  deserted. 
He  was  a  man  before  he  was  a  politician.  He  was  one  of  those  rare  characters 
who  could  remain  true  to  his  high  ideals  in  spite  of  politics. 

So,  now  stands  the  statue  of  the  immortal  Altgeld,  the  Colossus, 
looking    out   upon    Lake    Michigan,    with    that   firm,    placid    expression    upon 


PREFACE 

the  face,  that  the  writer  so  often  observed,  when  he,  in  his  matchless 
oratory,  pleaded  a  better,  juster  future  for  the  oppressed.  Grouped  around 
his  noble  form,  is  a  proletarian  family,  father,  mother  and  child,  closely 
nestling  under   his   outstretched  protecting   arm. 

It  is  seldom  that  the  artist  can  catch,  as  it  were,  the  real  character 
of  his  subject  sufficiently  clearly  to  enable  him  to  impress  it  upon  lifeless 
stone  and  metal,  but  Borglum,  the  designer,  has  shown  his  rare  genius  in 
impressing  upon  cold  impressionless  bronze  the  most  noble  characteristics 
of  his  subject,  that  of  protecting  the  weak  against  the  aggressions  of  the 
strong. 

When  death  laid  his  cold,  icy  grasp  upon  J.  P.  Altgeld,  and  declared  that 
time  for  him  should  be  no  more,  Altgeld,  at  that  very  moment,  was  pleading 
the  cause  of  oppressed  South  ^Africa  from  the  public  platform,  in  Joliet, 
111.   ^0  he^eli  as  the  hero  falleth — unconquered! 

Since  Illinois  was  admitted  as  a  sister  state  to  the  states  of  this 
union,  more  than  three-quarters  of  a  century  ago,  many  of  her  own  sons 
and  other  men  have  been  elected  to  govern  her,  but  only  one,  so  far, 
has  she  honored  with  a  monument  in  the  most  beautiful  park  of  her  larg- 
est city.  John  P.  Altgeld,  not  one  of  her  own  sons,  nor  even  a  native 
American,   has   this   distinguishing   honor. 

Why?  Because  he,  disregarding  the  blandishments  of  the  "mob  in 
purple  and  fine  linen,"  regardless  of  consequences,  followed  justice  where 
she  led,  and  she  led  him  to  the  prison  doors  of  Joliet,  where  three  inno- 
cent laboring  men  were  imprisoned.  She  seized  his  strong  arm,  back  flew 
bolts  and  bars,  opened  wide  the  doors,  three  working  men  are  restored 
to  their  families  and  their  friends, — vindicated  by  their  governor!  And 
the  five,  their  co-defendants,  who  had  been  murdered  five  years  previously, 
were  also  vindicated! 

In  the  years  to  come,  children  yet  unborn,  will  make  their  pilgrimages 
to  Lincoln  Park,  to  pay  homage  to  the  Governor,  who  had  the  courage 
to  stand  up  against  the  howls  of  the  ' '  mob  in  purple  and  fine  linen. ' ' 

LUCY  E.  PAESONS. 
Chicago,  Illinois,  September  8,  1915. 


ALTGELD'S  REASONS 

FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE 

AND  SCHWAB 


ALTGELD'S  REASONS  FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND 
SCHWAB. 

STATEMENT  OF  THE  CASE. 

On  the  night  of  May  4,  1886,  a  public  meeting  was  held  on  Haymarket 
Square  in  Chicago;  there  were  from  800  to  1,000  people  present,  nearly  all 
being  laboring  men.  There  had  been  trouble,  growing  out  of  the  effort  to 
introduce  an  eight-hour  day,  resulting  in  some  collisions  with  the  police,  in 
one  of  which  several  laboring  people  were  killed,  and  this  meeting  was  called 
as  a  protest  against  alleged  police  brutality. 

The  meeting  was  orderly  and  was  attended  by  the  mayor,  who  remained 
until  the  crowd  began  to  disperse,  and  then  went  away.  As  soon  as  Capt. 
John  Bonfield,  of  the  police  department,  learned  that  the  mayor  had  gone,  he 
took  a  detachment  of  police  and  hurried  to  the  meeting  for  the  purpose  of 
dispersing  the  few  that  remained,  and  as  the  police  approached  the  place  of 
meeting  a  bomb  was  thrown  by  some  unknown  person,  which  exploded  and 
wounded  many  and  killed  several  policemen,  amwig  the  latter  being  one 
Mathias  Degan.  A  number  of  people  were  arrested,  and  after  a  time  August 
Spies,  Albert  R.  Parsons,  Louis  Lingg,  Michael  Schwab,  Samuel  Fielden, 
George  Engel,  Adolph  Fischer  and  Oscar  Neebe  were  indicted  for  the  murder 
of  Mathias  Degan.  The  prosecution  could  not  discover  who  had  thrown  the 
bomb  and  could  not  bring  the  really  guilty  man  to  justice,  and,  as  some  of  the 
men  indicted  were  not  at  the  Haymarket  meeting  and  had  nothing  to  do  with 
it,  the  prosecution  was  forced  to  proceed  on  the  theory  that  the  men  indicted 
were  guilty  of  murder  because  it  was  claimed  they  had  at  various  times  in  the 
past  uttered  and  printed  incendiary  and  seditious  language,  practically 
advising  the  killing  of  policemen,  of  Pinkerton  men  and  others  acting  in  that 
capacity,  and  that  they  were  therefore  responsible  for  the  murder  of  Mathias 
Degan.  The  public  was  greatly  excited,  and  after  a  prolonged  trial  all  the 
defendants  were  found  guilty;  Oscar  Neebe  was  sentenced  to  fifteen  years 
imprisonment  and  all  of  the  other  defendants  were  sentenced  to  be  hanged. 
The  case  was  carried  to  the  Supreme  Court  and  was  there  affirmed  in  the  fall 
of  1887.  Soon  thereafter  Lingg  committed  suicide.  The  sentence  of  Fielden 
and  Schwab  was  commuted  to  imprisonment  for  life,  and  Parsons,  Fischer, 
Engel  and  Spies  were  hanged,  and  the  petitioners  now  ask  to  have  Neebe, 
Fielden  and  Schwab  set  at  liberty. 

The  several  thousand  merchants,  bankers,  judges,  lawyers  and  other 
prominent  citizens  of  Chicago  who  have  by  petition,  by  letter  and  in  other 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN^  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  287 

ways  urged  executive  clemency,  mostly  base  their  appeal  on  the  ground  that, 
assuming  the  prisoners  to  be  guilty,  they  have  been  punished  enough ;  but  a 
number  of  them  who  have  examined  the  case  more  carefully  and  are  more 
familiar  with  the  record  and  with  the  facts  disclosed  by  the  papers  on  file, 
base  their  appeal  on  entirely  different  grounds.    They  assert : 

First — That  the  jury  which  tried  the  case  was  a  packed  jury  selected  to 
convict. 

Second — That,  according  to  the  law  as  laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
both  prior  to  and  again  since  the  trial  of  this  case,  the  jurors,  according  to 
their  own  answers,  were  not  competent  jurors,  and  the  trial  was  therefore 
not  a  legal  trial. 

Third — That  the  defendants  were  not  proven  to  be  guilty  of  the  crime 
charged  in  the  indictment. 

Fourth — That  as  to  the  defendant  Neebe,  the  State's  attorney  had  declared 
at  the  close  of  the  evidence  that  there  was  no  case  against  him,  and  yet  he 
has  been  kept  in  prison  all  these  years. 

Fifth — That  the  trial  judge  was  either  so  prejudiced  against  the  defend- 
ants, or  else  so  determined  to  win  the  applause  of  a  certain  class  in  the  com- 
munity, that  he  could  not  and  did  not  grant  a  fair  trial. 

Upon  the  question  of  having  been  punished  enough,  I  will  simply  say  that 
if  the  defendants  had  a  fair  trial,  and  nothing  has  developed  since  to  show 
that  they  were  not  guilty  of  the  crime  charged  in  the  indictment,  then  there 
ought  to  be  no  executive  interference,  for  no  punishment  under  our  laws  could 
then  be  too  severe.  Government  must  defend  itself;  life  and  property  must 
be  protected,  and  law  and  order  must  be  maintained;  murder  must  be  pun- 
ished, and  if  the  defendants  are  guilty  of  murder,  either  committed  by  their 
own  hand's  or  by  some  one  else  acting  on  their  advice,  then,  if  they  have  had 
a  fair  trial,  there  should  be  in  this  case  no  executive  interference.  The  soil 
of  America  is  not  adopted  to  the  growth  of  Anarchy.  While  our  institutions 
are  not  free  from  injustice,  they  are  still  the  best  that  have  yet  been  devised, 
and  therefore  must  be  maintained. 

I.   WAS  THE  JURY  PACKED? 

The  record  of  the  trial  shows  that  the  jury  in  this  case  was  not  drawn  in 
the  manner  that  juries  usually  are  drawn;  that  is,  instead  of  having  a  num- 
ber of  names  drawn  out  of  a  box  that  contained  many  hundred  names,  as  the 
law  contemplates  shall  be  done  in  order  to  insure  a  fair  jury  and  give  neither 
side  the  advantage,  the  trial  judge  appointed  one  Henry  L.  Ryce  as  a  special 
bailiff  to  go  out  arftl  summon  such  men  as  he  (Ryce)  might  select  to  act  as 
jurors.  While  this  practice  has  been  sustained  in  cases  in  which  it  did  not 
appear  that  either  side  had  been  prejudiced  thereby,  it  is  always  a  dangerous 
practice,  for  it  gives  the  bailiff  absolute  power  to  select  a  jury  that  will  be 
favorable  to  one  side  or  the  other.     Counsel  for  the  State,  in  their  printed 


288  altgeld's  reasons 

brief,  say  that  Ryce  was  appointed  on  motion  of  defendants.  While  it  appears 
that  counsel  for  the  defendants  were  in  favor  of  having  some  one  appointed, 
the  record  has  this  entry : 

"Mr.  Grinnell  (the  State's  attorney)  suggested  Mr.  Ryce  as  special  bailiff, 
and  he  was  accepted  and  appointed."  B«t  it  makes  no  difference  on  whose 
motion  he  was  appointed  if  he  did  not  select  a  fair  jury.  It  is  s-hown  that  he 
boasted  while  selecting  jurors  that  he  was  m-anaging  this  case;  that  these 
fellows  would  hang  as  certain  as  death ;  that  he  was  calling  such  men  as  the 
defendants  would  have  to  challenge  peremptorily  and  waste  their  challenges 
on,  and  that  when  their  challenges  were  exhausted  they  would  have  to  take 
such  men  as  the  prosecution  wanted.  It  appears  from  the  recard  of  the  trial 
that  the  defendants  were  obliged  to  exhaust  all  of  their  peremptory  challenges, 
and  they  had  to  take  a  jury,  almost  every  member  of  which  stated  frankly 
that  he  was  prejudiced  against  them.  On  page  133  of  volume  I  of  the  record 
it  appears  that  when  the  panel  was  about  twa-thirds  full,  counsel  for  defend- 
ants called  attention  of  the  court  to  the  fact  that  Ryce  was  sunwnoning  only 
prejudiced  men,  as  shown  by  their  examinations.  Further:  That  he  was 
confining  himself  to  particular  classes ;  i.  c,  clerks,  merchants,  manufacturers, 
etc.  Counsel  for  defendants  then  moved  the  court  to  stop  this  and  direct 
Ryce  to  summon  the  jurors  from  the  body  of  the  people;  that  is,  from  the 
community  at  large,  and  not  from  particular  classes ;  but  the  court  refused  to 
take  any  notice  of  the  matter. 

For  the  purpose  of  still  further  showing  the  misconduct  of  Bailiff  Ryce 
reference  is  made  to  the  affidavit  of  Otis  S.  Favor.  Mr.  Favor  is  one  of  the 
most  reputable  and  honorable  business  men  in  Chicago ;  he  was  himself  sum- 
moned by  Ryce  as  a  juror,  but  was  so  prejudiced  against  the  defendants  that 
he  had  to  be  excused,  and  he  abstained  from  making  any  affidavit  before  sen- 
tence because  the  State's  attorney  had  requested  him  not  to  make  it,  although 
he  stood  ready  to  go  into  court  and  tell  what  he  knew  if  the  court  wished  him 
tc  do  so,  and  he  naturally  supposed  he  would  be  sent  for.  But  after  the  Su- 
preme Court  had  passed  on  the  case  and  some  of  the  defendants  were  about 
to  be  hanged  he  felt  that  an  injustice  was  being  done  and  he  made  the  fol- 
lowing affidavit : 

State  of  Illinois,  Cook  County. — ss. : 

Otis  S.  Favor,  being  duly  sworn,  on  oath  says  that  he  is  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  and  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  residing  in  Chicago,  and  a  merchant 
doing  business  at  Nos.  6  and  8  Wabash  avenue,  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  in  said 
county.  That  he  is  very  well  acquainted  with  Henry  L.  Ryce,  of  Cook  county, 
Illinois,  who  acted  as  special  bailiff  in  summoning  jurors  in  the  case  of  The 
People,  etc.,  vs.  Spies  et  al.,  indictment  for  murder,  tried  in  the  Criminal 
Court  of  Cook  county,  in  the  summer  of  1886.  That  affiant  was  himself  sum- 
moned by  said  Ryce  for  a  juror  in  said  cause,  but  was  challenged  and  excused 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  269 

therein  because  of  his  prejudice.  That  on  several  occasions  in  conversation 
between  affiant  and  said  Ryce  touching  the  summoning  of  the  jurors  by  said 
Ryce,  and  while  said  Ryce  was  so  acting  as  special  bailiff  as  aforesaid,  said 
Ryce  said  to  this  affiant  and  to  other  persons  in  affiant's  presence,  in  sub- 
stance and  effect  as  follows,  to-wit:  "I  (meaning  said  Ryce)  am  managing 
this  case  (meaning  this  case  against  Spies  et  al.)  and  know  what  I  am  about. 
Those  fellows  (meaning  the  defendants,  Spies  et  al.)  are  going  to  be  hanged  as 
certain  as  death.  I  am  calling  such  men  as  the  defendants  will  have  to  chal- 
lenge peremptorily  an-d  waste  their  time  and  challenges.  Then  they  will  have 
to  take  such  men  as  the  prosecution  wants."  That  affiant  has  been  very 
reluctant  to  make  any  affidavit  in  this  case,  having  no  sympathy  with  Anarchy 
nor  relationship  to  or  personal  interest  in  the  defendants  or  any  of  them,  and 
not  being  a  Socialist,  Communist  or  Anarchist ;  but  affiant  has  an  interest  as 
a  citizen,  in  the  due  administration  of  the  law,  and  that  no  injustice  should 
be  done  under  judicial  procedure,  and  believes  that  jurors  should  not  be 
selected  with  reference  to  their  known  views  or  prejudices.  Affiant  further 
says  that  his  personal  relations  with  said  Ryce  were  at  said  time,  and  foi- 
many  years  theretofore,  had  been  most  friendly  and  even  intimate,  and  that 
affiant  is  not  prompted  by  any  ill  will  toward  any  one  in  making  this  affidavit, 
but  solely  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  a  conviction  of  what  is  due  to  justice. 

Affiant  further  says  that  about  the  beginning  of  October,  1886,  when  the 
motion  for  a  new  trial  was  being  argued  in  said  cases  before  Judge  Gary,  and 
when,  as  he  was  informed,  application  was  made  before  Judge  Gary  for  leave 
to  examine  affiant  in  open  court,  touching  the  matters  above  stated,  this  affi- 
ant went,  upon  request  of  State's  Attorney  Grinnell,  to  his  office  during  the 
noon  recess  of  the  court  and  there  held  an  interview  with  said  Grinnell,  Mr. 
Ingham  and  said  Ryce,  in  the  presence  of  several  other  persons,  including 
some  police  officers,  where  affiant  repeated  substantially  the  matters  above 
slated,  and  the  said  Ryce  did  not  deny  affiant's  statements,  and  affiant  said 
he  would  have  to  testify  thereto  if  summoned  as  a  witness,  but  had  refused  to 
make  an  affidavit  thereto,  and  affiant  was  then  and  there  asked  and  urged  to 
persist  in  his  refusal  and  to  make  no  affidavit.     And  affiant  further  saith  not. 

Otis  S.  Favor, 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  me  this  7th  day  of  November,  A.  D.  1887. 

Julius  Stern, 
Notary  Public  in  and  for  said  County. 

So  far  as  shown  no  one  connected  with  the  State's  attorney's  office  has 
ever  denied  the  statements  of  Mr.  Favor  as  to  what  took  place  in  that  office, 
although  his  affidavit  was  made  in  November,  1887. 

As  to  Bailiff  Ryce,  it  appears  that  he  has  made  an  affidavit  in  which  he 
denies  that  he  made  the  statements  sworn  to  by  Mr.  Favor,  but  unfortunately 
for  him,  the  record  of  the  trial  is  against  him,  for  it  shows  conclusively  that 


290  ALTGELD  S    REASONS 

he  summoned  only  the  class  of  men  mentioned  in  Mr.  Favor's  affidavit.  Ac- 
cording to  the  record,  981  men  were  examined  as  to  their  qualifications  as 
jurors,  and  most  of  them  vi^ere  either  employers,  or  men  who  had  been  pointed 
out  to  the  bailiff  by  their  employer.  The  following,  taken  from  the  original 
record  of  the  trial,  are  fair  specimens  of  the  answers  of  nearly  all  the  jurors, 
except  that  in  the  following  cases  the  court  succeeded  in  getting  the  jurors  to 
say  that  they  believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  notwithstanding  their 
prejudices. 

EXAMINATION    OF   JURORS. 

William  Neil,  a  manufacturer,  was  examined  at  length;  stated  that  he 
had  heard  and  read  about  the  Haymarket  trouble,  and  believed  enough  of 
what  he  had  so  heard  and  read  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
fendants, which  he  still  entertained ;  that  he  had  expressed  said  opinion,  and 
then  he  added :  "It  would  take  pretty  strong  evidence  to  remove  the  impres- 
sion that  I  now  have.  I  could  not  dismiss  it  from  my  mind ;  could  not  lay  it 
altogether  aside  during  the  trial.  I  believe  my  present  opinion,  based  upon 
what  he  had  so  heard  and  read  to  form  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  de- 
would  influence  me  in  determining  and  getting  at  a  verdict." 

He  was  challenged  by  the  defendants  on  the  ground  of  being  prejudiced, 
but  the  court  then  got  him  to  say  that  he  believed  he  could  give  a  fair  verdict 
on  whatever  evidence  he  should  hear,  and  thereupon  the  challenge  was  over- 
ruled. 

H.  F.  Chandler,  in  the  stationery  business  with  Skeen,  Stuart  &  Co.,  said : 
"1  was  pointed  out  to  the  deputy  sheriff  by  my  employer  to  be  summoned  as 
a  juror."  He  then  stated  that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  Haymarket 
trouble,  and  had  formed  and  frequently  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt 
of  the  defendants,  and  that  he  believed  the  statements  he  had  read  and  heard. 
He  was  asked: 

Q.     Is  that  a  decided  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants? 

A.     It  is  a  decided  opinion ;  yes,  sir. 

Q.     Your  mind  is  pretty  well  made  up  now  as  to  their  guilt  or  innocence? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

Q.     Would  it  be  hard  to  change  your  opinion, 

A.  It  might  be  hard;  I  cannot  say.  I  don't  know  whether  it  would  be 
hard  or  not. 

He  was  challenged  by  the  defendants  on  the  ground  of  being  prejudiced. 
Then  the  court  took  him  in  hand  and  examined  him  at  some  length,  and  got 
him  to  state  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly.  Then  the  challenge 
was  overruled. 

F.  L.  Wilson:  Am  a  manufacturer.  Am  prejudiced  and  have  formed  and 
expressed  an  opinion ;  that  opinion  would  influence  me  in  rendering  a  verdict. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause,  but  was  then  examined  by  the  court. 

Q.     Are  you  conscious  in  your  own  mind  of  any  wish  or  desire  that  there 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  29I 

should  be  evidence  produced  in  this  trial  which  should  prove  some  of  these 
rnen,  or  any  of  them,   to  be  guilty? 

A.     Well,  I   think  I   have. 

Being  further  pressed  by  the  court,  he  said  that  the  only  feeling  he  had 
against  the  defendants  was  based  upon  having  taken  it  for  granted  that  what 
he  read  about  them  was,  in  the  main,  true;  that  he  believed  that  sitting  as  a 
juror  the  effect  of  the  evidence  either  for  or  against  the  defendants  would  be 
increased  or  diminished  by  what  he  had  heard  or  read  about  the  case.  Then 
on  being  still  further  pressed  by  the  court,  he  finally  said :  "Well,  I  feel  that 
I  hope  that  the  guilty  one  will  be  discovered  or  punished — not  necessarily 
these  mjen." 

Q.  Are  you  conscious  of  any  other  wish  or  desire  about  the  matter  than 
that  the  actual  truth  may  be   discovered? 

A.     I  don't  think  I  am. 

Thereupon  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

George  N.  Porter,  grocer,  testified  that  he  had  formed  and  expressed  an 
opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants,  and  that  this  opinion  he  thought, 
would  bias  his  judgment;  he  would  try  to  go  by  the  evidence,  but  what  he 
had  read  would  have  a  great  deal  to  do  with  his  verdict;  his  mind,  he  said, 
was  certainly  biased  now,  and  that  it  would  take  a  great  deal  of  evidence  to 
change  it.  He  was  challenged  for  cause  by  the  defendants ;  was  examined  by 
the  court  and  said: 

"I  think  what  I  have  heard  and  read  before  I  came  into  court  would  have 
some  influence  with  me."  But  the  court  finally  got  him  to  say  he  believed  he 
could  fairly  and  impartially  try  the  case  and  render  a  verdict  according  to  law 
and  evidence,  and  that  he  would  try  to  do  so.  Thereupon  the  court  overruled 
the  challenge  for  cause.  Then  he  was  asked  some  more  questions  by  defend- 
ants' counsel,  and  among  other  things  said: 

"Why,  we  have  talked  about  it  there  a  great  many  times  and  I  have  always 
expressed  my  opinion.  I  believe  what  I  have  read  in  the  papers ;  believe  that 
the  parties  are  guilty.  I  would  try  to  go  by  the  evidence,  but  in  this  case  it 
would  be  awful  hard  work  for  me  to  do  it." 

He  was  challenged  a  second  time  on  the  ground  of  being  prejudiced;  was 
then  again  taken  in  hand  by  the  court  and  examined  at  length,  and  finally 
again  said  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence,  when  the 
challenge   for  cause   was  overruled  for  the  second  time. 

H.  N.  Smith,  hardware  merchant,  stated  among  other  things  that  he  was 
prejudiced  and  had  quite  a  decided  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
defendants;  that  he  had  expressed  his  opinion  and  stil)  entertained  it,  and 
candidly  stated  that  he  was  afraid  he  would  listen  a  little  more  attentively  to 
the  testimony  which  concurred  with  his  opinion  than  the  testimony  on  the 
other  side;  that  some  of  the  policemen  injured  were  personal  friends  of  his. 
He  was  asked  these  questions: 


292  ALTGELD  S    REASONS 

Q.  That  is,  you  would  be  willing  to  have  your  opinion  strengthened,  and 
hate  very  much  to  have  it  dissolved? 

A.    I  would. 

Q.  Under  these  circumstances  do  you  think  that  you  could  render  a  fair 
and  impartial  verdict? 

A.     I  don't  think  I  could. 

Q,     You  think  you  would  be  prejudiced? 

A.     I  think  I  would  be,  because  my  feelings  are  very  bitter. 

Q.  Would  your  prejudice  in  any  way  influence  you  in  coming  at  an  opin- 
ion, in  arriving  at  a  verdict? 

A.     I  think  it  would. 

He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  being  prejudiced,  was  interrogated  at 
length  by  the  court,  and  was  brought  to  say  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case 
fairly  on  the  evidence  produced  in  court.     Then  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

Leonard  Gould,  wholesale  grocer,  was  examined  at  length ;  said  he  had  a 
decided  prejudice  against  the  defendants.  Among  other  things,  he  said:  "I 
really  don't  know  that  I  could  do  the  case  justice;  if  I  was  to  sit  on  the  case  I 
should  just  give  my  undivided  attention  to  the  evidence  and  calculate  to  be 
governed  by  that."  He  was  challenged  for  cause  and  the  challenge  overruled. 
He  was  then  asked  the  question  over  again,  whether  he  could  render  an  impar- 
tial verdict  based  upon  the  evidence  alone,  that  would  be  produced  in  court, 
and  he  answered:    "Well,  I  answered  that,  as  far  as  I  could  answer  it." 

Q.     You  say  you  don't  know  that  you  can  answer  that,  either  yes  or  no? 

A.    No,  I  don't  know  that  I  can. 

Thereupon  the  court  proceeded  to  examine  him,  endeavoring  to  get  him 
to  state  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  upon  the  evidence  that 
was  produced  in  court,  part  of  the  examination  being  as  follows : 

Q.  Now,  do  you  believe  that  you  can — that  you  have  sufficiently  reflected 
tipon  it — so  as  to  examine  your  own  mind,  that  you  can  fairly  and  impartially 
determine  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants? 

A.     That  is  a  difficult  question  for  me  to  answer. 

Q.  Well,  make  up  your  mind  as  to  whether  you  can  render,  fairly  and 
impartially  render,  a  verdict  in  accordance  with  the  law  and  the  evidence. 
Most  men  in  business  possibly  have  not  gone  through  a  metaphysical  examina- 
tion so  as  to  be  prepared  to  answer  a  question  of  this  kind. 

A.     Judge,  I   don't  believe  I  can  answer  that  question. 

Q.     Can  you  answer  whether  you  believe  you  know? 

A.     Ifl  had  to  do  that  I  should  do  the  best  I  could. 

Q.  The  question  is  whether  you  believe  you  could  or  not.  I  suppose, 
Mr.  Gould,  that  you  know  the  law  is  that  no  man  is  to  be  convicted  of  any 
oflfense  with  which  he  is  charged,  unless  the  evidence  proves  that  he  is  guilty 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt? 

A.     That   is  true. 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  293 

Q.     The  evidence  heard  in  this  case  in   court? 

A.     Yes. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  you  can  render  a  verdict  in  accordance  with 
the  law? 

A.     Well,  I  don't  know  that  I  could. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  you  can't — if  you  don't  know  of  any  reason  why 
you  cannot,  do  you  believe  that  you  can't? 

A.     I  cannot  answer  that  question. 

Q.  Have  you  a  belief  one  way  or  other  as  to  whether  you  can  or  cannot? 
Not  whether  you  are  going  to  do  it,  but  do  you  believe  you  cannot?  That 
is  the  only  thing.  You  are  not  required  to  state  what  is  going  to  happen  next 
week  or  week  after,  but  what  do  you  believe  about  yourself,  whether  you  can 
or  can't. 

A.    I  am  about  where  I  was  when  I  started. 

Some  more  questions  were  asked  and  Mr.  Gould  answered-. 

Well,  I  believe  I  have  gone  just  as  far  as  I  can  in  reply  to  that  question. 

Q.  This  question,  naked  and  simple  in  itself  is,  do  you  believe  that  you 
can  fairly  and  impartially  render  a  verdict  in  the  case  in  accordance  with  the 
law  and  evidence? 

A.     I  believe  I  could. 

Having  finally  badgered  the  juror  into  giving  this  last  answer,  the  court 
desisted.     The  defendants'  counsel  asked: 

Do  you  believe  you  can  do  so,  uninfluenced  by  any  prejudice  or  opinion 
which  you  now  have? 

A.  You  bring  it  at  a  point  that  I  object  to  and  I  do  not  feel  competent 
to  answer. 

Thereupon  the  juror  was  challenged  a  second  time  for  cause,  and  the 
challenge  was  overruled. 

James  H.  Walker,  dry  goods  merchant,  stated  that  he  had  formed  and 
expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  defendants;  that  he  was  prejudiced, 
and  that  his  prejudice  would  handicap  him. 

Q.  Considering  all  prejudice  and  all  opinions  you  have,  if  the  testimony 
was  equally  balanced,  would  you  decide  one  way  or  the  other  in  accordance 
with  that  opinion  or  your  prejudice? 

A.  If  the  testimony  was  equally  balanced  I  should  hold  my  present 
opinion,  sir. 

Q.  Assuming  that  your  present  opinion  is,  that  you  believe  the  defend- 
ants guilty,  would  you  believe  your  present  opinion  would  warrant  you  in 
convicting  them? 

A.     I  presume  it  would. 

Q.     Well,  you  believe  it  would;  that  is  your  present  belief,  is  it? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice. 


294  altgeld's  reasons 

The  court  then  examined  him  at  length,  and  finally  asked: 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  you  can  sit  here  and  fairly  and  impartially  make 
up  your  mind,  from  the  evidence,  whether  that  evidence  proves  that  they  are 
guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  or  not? 

A.  I  think  I  could,  but  I  should  believe  that  I  was  a  little  handicapped 
in  my  judgment,  sir. 

Thereupon  the  court,  in  the  presence  of  the  jurors  not  yet  examined, 
remarked : 

Well,  that  is  a  sufficient  qualification  for  a  juror  in  the  case;  of  course, 
the  more  a  man  feels  that  he  is  handicapped  the  more  he  will  be  guarded 
against  it. 

W.  B.  Allen,  wholesale  rubber  business,  stated  among  other  things : 

Q.  I  will  ask  you  whether  what  you  have  formed  from  what  you  have 
read  and  heard  is  a  slight  impression,  or  an  opinion,  or  a  conviction. 

A.     It  is  a  decided  conviction. 

Q.  You  have  made  up  your  mind  as  to  whether  these  men  are  guilty  or 
innocent  ? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

Q.     It  would  be  difficult  to  change  that  conviction,  or  impossible,  perhaps? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

Q.     It  would  be  impossible  to  change  your  conviction? 

A.       It  would  be  hard  to  change  my  conviction. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause  by  defendants.  Then  he  was  examined  by 
the  court  at  length  and  finally  brought  to  the  point  of  saying  that  he  could 
try  the  case  fairly  and  impartially,  and  would  do  so.  Then  the  challenge  for 
cause  was  overruled. 

H.  L.  Anderson  was  examined  at  length,  and  stated  that  he  had  formed 
and  expressed  an  opinion,  still  held  it,  was  prejudiced,  but  that  he  could  lay 
aside  his  prejudices  and  grant  a  fair  trial  upon  the  evidence.  On  being  fur- 
ther examined,  he  said  that  some  of  the  policemen  injured  were  friends  of  his 
and  he  had  talked  with  them  fully.  He  had  formed  an  unqualified  opinion  as 
to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants,  which  he  regarded  as  deep-seated, 
a  firm  conviction  that  these  defendants,  or  some  of  them,  were  guilty.  He 
was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice,  but  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

M.  D.  Flavin,  in  the  marble  business.  He  had  read  and  talked  about  the 
Haymarket  trouble,  and  had  formed  and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt 
or  innocence  of  the  defendants,  which  he  still  held  and  which  was  very  strong ; 
further,  that  one  of  the  officers  killed  at  the  Haymarket  was  a  relative  of  his, 
although  the  relationship  was  distant,  but  on  account  of  this  relationship  his 
feelings  were  perhaps  different  from  what  they  would  have  been,  and  occa- 
sioned a  very  strong  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants,  and  that  he  had 
stated  to  others  that  he  believed  what  he  had  heard  and  read  about  the  mat- 
ter.   He  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice,  and  then  stated,  in  answer 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  295 

to  a  question  from  the  prosecution,  that  he  believed  that  he  could  give  a  fair 
and  impartial  verdict,  when  the  challenge  was  overruled. 

THE  TWELVE  WHO  TRIED  THE  CASE. 

The  twelve  jurors  whom  the  defendants  were  finally  forced  to  accept, 
after  the  challenges  were  exhausted,  were  of  the  same  general  character  as  the 
others,  and  a  number  of  them  stated  candidly  that  they  were  so  prejudiced 
that  they  could  not  try  the  case  fairly,  but  each,  when  examined  by  the  court, 
was  finally  induced  to  say  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  upon 
the  evidences  that  was  produced  in  court  alone.     For  example: 

Theodore  Denker,  one  of  the  twelve :  "Am  shipping  clerk  for  Henry  W. 
King  &  Co.  I  have  read  and  talked  about  the  Haymarket  tragedy,  and  have 
formed  and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defend- 
ants of  the  crime  charged  in  the  indictment.  I  believe  what  I  read  and  heard, 
and   still   entertain   that   opinion." 

Q.  Is  that  opinion  such  as  to  prevent  you  from  rendering  an  impartial 
verdict  in  the  case,  sitting  as  a  juror,  under  the  testimony  and  the  law? 

A.     I  think  it  is. 

He  was  challenged  for  cause  on  the  ground  of  prejudice.  Then  the  State's 
attorney  and  the  court  examined  him  and  finally  got  him  to  say  that  he 
believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  law  and  the  evidence,  and  the 
challenge  was  overruled.  He  was  then  asked  further  questions  by  the  de- 
fendants' counsel,  and  said : 

"I  have  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants  and  have 
expressed  it.  We  conversed  about  the  matter  in  the  business  house  and  J  ex- 
pressed my  opinion  there;  expressed  my  opinion  quite  frequently.  My  mind 
was  made  up  from  what  I  read  and  I  did  not  hesitate  to  speak  about  it." 

Q.  Would  you  feel  yourself  in  any  way  governed  or  bound  in  listening 
to  the  testimony  and  determining  it  upon  the  pre-judgment  of  the  case  that 
you  had  expressed  to  others  before? 

A.     Well,  that  is  a  pretty  hard  question  to  answer. 

He  then  stated  to  the  court  that  he  had  not  expressed  an  opinion  as  to 
the  truth  of  the  reports  he  had  read,  and  finally  stated  that  he  believed  he 
could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence. 

John  B.  Greiner,  another  one  of  the  twelve :  "Am  a  clerk  for  the  North- 
western railroad.  I  have  heard  and  read  about  the  killing  of  Degan,  at  the 
Haymarket,  on  May  4,  last,  and  have  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  defendants  now  on  trial  for  that  crime.  It  is  evident  that 
the  defendants  are  connected  with  that  aflfair  from  their  being  there." 

Q.     You  regard  that  as  evidence? 

A.  Well,  I  don't  know  exactly.  Of  course  I  would  expect  that  it  con- 
nected them  or  they  would  not  be  here. 


296  altgeld's  reasons 

Q.  So,  then,  the  opinion  that  you  now  have  has  reference  to  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  some  of  these  men,  or  all  of  them? 

A.     Certainly. 

Q.  Now,  is  that  opinion  one  that  would  influence  your  verdict  if  you 
should  be  selected  as  a  juror  to  try  the  case? 

A,  I  certainly  think  it  would  afifect  it  to  some  extent;  I  don't  see  how  it 
could  be  otherwise. 

He  further  stated  that  there  had  been  a  strike  in  the  freight  department 
of  the  Northwestern  road,  which  affected  the  department  he  was  in.  After 
some  further  examination  he  stated  that  he  thought  he  could  try  the  case 
fairly  on  the  evidence,  and  was  then  held  to  be  competent. 

G.  W.  Adams,  also  one  of  the  twelve:  "Am  a  traveling  salesman;  have 
been  an  employer  of  painters.  I  read  and  talked  about  the  Haymarket  trouble 
and  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the  crime  committed 
there.    I  conversed  freely  with  my  friends  about  the  matter." 

Q.  Did  you  form  an  opinion  at  the  time  that  the  defendants  were  con- 
nected with  or  responsible  for  the  commission  of  that  crime? 

A.     I  thought  some  of  them  were  interested  in  it ;  yes. 

Q.     And  you  still  think  so? 

A.     Yes. 

Q.  Nothing  has  transpired  in  the  interval  to  change  your  mind  at  all,  I 
suppose. 

A.     No,  sir. 

Q.  You  say  some  of  them;  that  is,  in  the  newspaper  accounts  that  you 
read,  the  names  of  some  of  the  defendants  were  referred  to? 

A.     Yes,  sir. 

After  further  examination  he  testified  that  he  thought  he  could  try  the 
case  fairly  on  the  evidence. 

H.  T.  Sanford,  another  one  of  the  twelve;  Clerk  for  the  Northwestern 
railroad,  in  the  freight  auditor's  office: 

Q.  Have  you  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants  of 
the  murder  of  Mathias  J.  Degan? 

A.     I  have. 

Q.  From  all  that  you  have  heard  and  that  you  have  read,  have  you  an 
opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendants  of  throwing  the  bomb  ? 

A.     Yes,  sir;  I  have. 

Q.     Have  you  a  prejudice  against  Socialists  and  Communists? 

A.     Yes,  sir;   a  decided  prejudice. 

Q.  Do  you  believe  that  that  prejudice  would  influence  your  verdict  in 
this  case? 

A.  Well,  as  I  know  so  little  about  it,  it  is  a  pretty  hard  question  to 
answer.  I  have  an  opinion  in  my  own  mind  that  the  defendants  encouraged 
the  throwing  of  that  bomb. 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  297 

Challenged  on  the  ground  of  prejudice. 

On  further  examination,  stated  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly 
upon  the  evidence,  and  the  challenge  for  cause  was  overruled. 

Upon  the  whole,  therefore,  considering  the  facts  brought  to  light  since 
the  trial,  as  well  as  the  record  of  the  trial  and  the  answers  of  the  jurors  as 
given  therein,  it  is  clearly  shown  that,  while  the  counsel  for  defendants  agreed 
to  it,  Ryce  was  appointed  special  bailiff  at  the  suggestion  of  the  State's  attor- 
ney, and  that  he  did  summon  a  prejudiced  jury  which  he  believed  would  hang 
the  defendants ;  and  further,  that  the  fact  that  Ryce  was  summoning  only  that 
kind  of  men  was  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  court  before  the  panel  was 
full,  and  it  was  asked  to  stop  it,  but  refused  to  pay  any  attention  to  the  mat- 
ter, but  permitted  Ryce  to  go  on,  and  then  forced  the  defendants  to  go  to 
trial  before  this  jury. 

While  no  collusion  is  proven  between  the  judge  and  the  State's  attorney, 
it  is  clearly  shown  that  after  the  verdict  and  while  a  motion  for  a  new  trial 
was  pending,  a  charge  was  filed  in  court  that  Ryce  had  packed  the  jury,  and 
that  the  attorney  for  the  State  got  Mr.  Favor  to  refuse  to  make  an  affidavit 
bearing  on  this  point,  which  the  defendants  could  use,  and  then  the  court 
refused  to  take  any  notice  of  it  unless  the  affidavit  was  obtained,  although  it 
was  informed  that  Mr.  Favor  would  not  make  an  affidavit,  but  stood  ready  to 
come  into  court  and  make  a  full  statement  if  the  court  desired  him  to  do  so. 

These  facts  alone  would  call  for  executive  interference,  especially  as  Mr. 
Favor's  affidavit  was  not  before  the  Supreme  Court  at  the  time  it  considered 
the  case. 

RECENT  DECISION  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AS  TO  COMPETENCY  OF  JITRORS. 
II. 

The  second  point  argued  seems  to  me  to  be  equally  conclusive.  In  the  case 
of  the  People  vs.  Coughlin,  known  as  the  Cronin  case,  recently  decided,  the 
Supreme  Court,  in  a  remarkably  able  and  comprehensive  review  of  the  law  on 
this  subject,  says,  among  other  things: 

"The  holdings  of  this  and  other  courts  is  substantially  uniform,  that  where 
it  is  once  clearly  shown  that  there  exists  in  the  mind  of  the  juror,  at  the  time 
he  is  called  to  the  jury  box,  a  fixed  and  positive  opinion  as  to  the  merits  of 
the  case,  or  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defendant  he  is  called  to  try. 
his  statement  that,  notwithstanding  such  opinion,  he  can  render  a  fair  and  im- 
partial verdict  according  to  the  law  and  evidence,  has  little,  if  any,  tendency 
to  establish  his  impartiality.  This  is  so  because  the  juror  who  has  sworn  to 
have  in  his  mind  a  fixed  and  positive  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  accused,  is  not  impartial,  as  a  matter  of  fact.    *    *    * 

"It  is  difficult  to  see  how,  after  a  juror  has  avowed  a  fixed  and  settled  opin- 
ion as  to  the  prisoner's  guilt,  a  court  can  be  legally  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  his 


298  altgeld's  reasons 

answer  that  he  can  render  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict,  or  find  therefrom  that 
he  has  the  qualification  of  impartiality,  as  required  by  the  constitution.  *  *  *  * 

"Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  idle  to  inquire  of  the  jurors  whether  they 
can  return  just  and  impartial  verdicts.  The  more  clear  and  positive  were  their 
impressions  of  guilt,  the  more  certain  they  may  be  that  they  can  act  impar- 
tially in  condemning  the  guilty  party.  They  go  into  the  box  in  a  state  of  mind 
that  is  well  calculated  to  give  a  color  of  guilt  to  all  evidence,  and  if  the  ac- 
cused escapes  conviction,  it  will  not  be  because  the  evidence  has  not  estab- 
lished guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  but  because  an  accused  party  con- 
demned in  advance,  and  called  upon  to  exculpate  himself  before  a  prejudiced 
tribunal,  has  succeeded  in  doing  so.     *    *     *    * 

"To  try  a  cause  by  such  a  jury  is  to  authorize  men,  who  state  that  they  will 
lean  in  their  finding  against  one  of  the  parties,  unjustly  to'  determine  the 
rights  of  others,  and  it  will  be  no  difficult  task  to  predict,  even  before  the  evi- 
dence was  heard,  the  verdict  that  would  be  rendered.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that 
instructions  from  the  court  would  correct  the  bias  of  the  jurors  who  swear 
they  incline  in  favor  of  one  of  the  litigants.     *    *    * 

"Bontecou  (one  of  the  jurors  in  the  Cronin  case),  it  is  true,  was  brought  to 
make  answer  that  he  could  render  a  fair  and  impartial  verdict  in  accordance 
with  the  law  and  the  evidence,  but  that  result  was  reached  only  after  a  singu- 
larly argumentative  and  persuasive  cross-examination  by  the  court,  in  which 
the  right  of  every  person  accused  of  crime  to  an  impartial  trial  and  to  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence  until  proved  guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  the 
duty  of  every  citizen,  when  summoned  as  a  juror,  to  lay  aside  all  opinions  and 
prejudices  and  accord  the  accused  such  a  trial,  was  set  forth  and  descanted 
upon  at  length,  and  in  which  the  intimation  was  very  clearly  made  that  a  juror 
who  could  not  do  this  was  recreant  to  his  duty  as  a  man  and  a  citizen.  Under 
pressure  of  this  sort  of  cross-examination,  Bontecou  seems  to  have  been 
finally  brought  to  make  answer  in  such  a  way  as  to  profess  an  ability  to  sit  as 
an  impartial  juror,  and  on  his  so  answering  he  was  pronounced  competent 
and  the  challenge  as  to  him  was  overruled.  Whatever  may  be  the  weight  or- 
dinarily due  to  statements  of  this  character  of  jurors,  their  value  as  evidence 
is  in  no  small  degree  impaired  in  this  case  by  the  mode  in  which  they  were,  in 
a  certain  sense,  forced  from  the  mouth  of  the  juror.  The  theory  seemed  to  be, 
that  if  a  juror  could  in  any  way  be  brought  to  answer  that  he  could  sit  as  an 
impartial  juror,  that  declaration  of  itself  rendered  him  competent.  Such  a 
view,  if  it  was  entertained,  was  a  total  misconception  of  the  law.     *    *    * 

"It  requires  no  profound  knowledge  of  human  nature  to  know  that  with 
srdinary  men  opinions  and  prejudices  are  not  amenable  to  the  power  of  the 
will,  however  honest  the  intention  of  the  party  may  be  to  put  them  aside.  They 
are  likely  to  remain  in  the  mind  of  the  juror  in  spite  of  all  his  efiforts  to  get 
rid  of  them,  warping  and  giving  direction  to  his  judgment,  coloring  the  facts 
as  they  are  developed  by  the  evidence,  and  exerting  an  influence  more  or  less 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  299 

potent,  though  it  be  unconsciously  to  the  juror  himself,  an  the  final  result  of 
his  deliberations.  To  compel  a  person  accused  of  a  crime  to  be  tried  by  a 
juror  who  has  prejudiced  his  case  is  not  a  fair  trial.  Nor  should  a  defendant 
be  compelled  to  rely,  as  his  security  for  the  impartiality  of  the  jurors  by  whom 
he  is  to  be  tried,  upon  the  restraining  and  controlling  influence  upon  the  juror's 
mind  of  his  oath  to  render  a  true  verdict  according  to  the  law  and  the  evi- 
dence. His  impartiality  should  appear  before  he  is  permitted  to  take  the  oath. 
If  he  is  not  impartial  then,  his  oath  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  make  him  so.  In 
the  terse  and  expressive  language  of  Lord  Coke,  already  quoted,  the  jury 
should  'stand  indifferent  as  he  stands  unsworn.' " 

Applying  the  law  as  here  laid  down  in  the  Cronin  case  to  the  answers  of  the 
jurors  above  given  in  the  present  case,  it  is  very  apparent  that  most  of  the 
jurors  were  incompetent  because  they  were  not  impartial,  for  nearly  all  of  them 
candidly  stated  that  they  were  prejudiced  against  the  defendants,  and  believed 
them  guilty  before  hearing  the  evidence,  and  the  mere  fact  th^t  the  judge  suc- 
ceeded, by  a  singula''ly  suggestive  examination,  in  getting  them  to  state  that 
they  believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  fair  on  the  evidence,  did  not  make 
them  competent. 

It  is  true  that  this  case  was  before  the  Supreme  Court,  and  that  court  al- 
lowed the  verdict  to  stand;  and  it  is  also  true  that  in  the  opinion  of  the  ma- 
jority of  the  court  in  the  Cronin  case,  an  effort  is  made  to  distinguish  that 
case  from  this  one ;  but  it  is  evident  that  the  court  did  not  have  the  record  of 
this  case  before  it  when  it  tried  to  make  the  distinction,  and  the  opinion  of  the 
minority  of  the  court  in  the  Cronin  case  expressly  refers  to  this  case  as  being 
exactly  like  that  one,  so  far  as  relates  to  the  competency  of  the  jurors.  The 
answers  of  the  jurors  were  almost  identical  and  the  examinations  were  the 
same.  The  very  things  which  the  Supreme  Court  held  to  be  fatal  errors  in 
the  Cronin  c'ase,  constituted  the  entire  fabric  of  this  case,  so  far  as  relates  to 
the  competency  of  the  jury.  In  fact,  the  trial  judge  in  the  Cronm  case  was 
guided  by  the  rule  laid  down  in  this  case,  yet  the  Supreme  Court  reversed  the 
Cronin  case  because  two  of  the  jurors  were  held  to  be  incompetent,  each  hav- 
ing testified  that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  case,  and  had  formed  and 
expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  of  the  defendants  ;  that  he  was  prejudiced  ; 
that  he  believed  what  he  had  read,  and  that  his  prejudice  might  influence  his 
verdict;  that  his  prejudice  amounted  to  a  conviction  on  the  subject  of  the  guilt 
or  innocence  of  the  defendants;  but  each  finally  said  that  he  could  and  would 
try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence  alone,  etc. 

A  careful  comparison  of  the  examination  of  these  two  jurors  with  that  of 
many  of  the  jurors  in  this  case  shows  that  a  number  of  the  jurors  expressed 
themselves,  if  anything,  more  strongly  against  the  defendants  than  these  two 
did;  and  what  is  still  more,  one  of  those  summoned,  Mr.  M.  D.  Flavin,  in  this 
case,  testified  not  only  that  he  had  read  and  talked  about  the  case,  and  had 
formed  and  expressed  an  opinion  as  to  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  defend- 


300  ALTGELD  S    REASONS 

ants,  that  he  was  bitterly  prejudiced,  but  further,  that  he  was  related  to  one  of 
the  men  who  were  killed,  and  that  for  that  reason  he  felt  more  strongly  against 
the  defendants  than  he  otherwise  might,  yet  he  was  held  to  be  competent  on 
his  mere  statement  that  he  believed  he  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence. 
No  matter  what  the  defendants  were  charged  with  they  were  entitled  to  a 
fair  trial,  and  no  greater  danger  could  possibly  threaten  our  institutions  than 
to  have  the  courts  of  justice  run  wild  or  give  way  to  popular  clamor ;  and- when 
the  trial  judge  in  this  case  ruled  that  a  relative  of  one  of  the  men  who  was 
killed  was  a  competent  juror,  and  this  after  the  man  had  candidly  stated  that 
he  was  deeply  prejudiced,  and  that  his  relationship  caused  him  to  feel  more 
strongly  than  he  otherwise  might ;  and  when,  in  scores  of  instances,  he  ruled 
that  men  who  candidly  declared  that  they  believed  the  defendants  to  be  guilty, 
that  this  was  a  deep  conviction  and  would  influence  their  verdict,  and  that  it 
would  require  strong  evidence  to  convince  them  that  the  defendants  were  inno- 
cent; when  in  all  these  instances  the  trial  judge  ruled  that  these  men  were 
competent  jurors,  simp-ly  because  they  had,  under  his  adroit  manipulation,  been 
led  to  say  that  they  believed  they  could  try  the  case  fairly  on  the  evidence, 
then  the  proceedings  lost  all  semblance  of  a  fair  trial. 

III.      DOES  THE  PROOF  SHOW  GUILT f 

The  State  has  never  discovered  who  it  was  that  threw  the  bomb  which 
killed  the  policeman,  and  the  evidence  does  not  show  any  connection  whatever 
between  the  defendants  and  the  man  who  did  throw  it.  The  trial  judge,  in 
overruling  the  motion  for  a  new  hearing,  and  again,  recently  in  a  magazine 
article,  used  this  language: 

"The  conviction  has  not  gone  on  the  grofund  that  they  did  have  actually  any 
personal  participation  in  the  particular  act  which  caused  the  death  of  Began, 
but  the  conviction  proceeds  upon  the  ground  that  they  had  generally,  by 
speech  and  print,  advised  large  classes  of  the  people,  not  particular  indi- 
dividuals,  but  large  classes,  to  commit  murder,  and  had  left  the  commission, 
the  time  and  place  and  when,  to  the  individual  will  and  whim  or  caprice,  or 
whatever  it  may  be,  of  each  individual  man  who  listened  to  their  advice,  and 
that  in  consequence  of  that  advice,  in  pursuance  of  that  advice,  and  influenced 
by  that  advice,  somebody  not  known  did  throw  the  bomb  that  caused  Degan's 
death.  Now,  if  this  is  not  a  correct  principle  of  the  law,  then  the  defendants 
of  course  are  entitled  to  a  new  trial.  This  case  is  without  a  precedent ;  there 
is  no  example  in  the  law  books  of  a  case  of  this  sort." 

The  judge  certainly  told  the  truth  when  he  stated  that  this  case  was  with- 
out a  precedent,  and  that  no  example  could  be  found  in  the  law  books  to  susw 
tain  the  law  as  above  laid  down.  For,  in  all  the  centuries  during  which  gov- 
ernment has  been  maintained  among  men,  and  crime  has  been  punished,  no 
judge  in  a  civilized  country  has  ever  laid  down  such  a  rule  before.  The  peti- 
tioners claim  that  it  was  laid  down  in  this  case  simply  because  the  prosecu- 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN^  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  30I 

tion,  not  having  discovered  the  real  criminal,  would  otherwise  not  have  been 
able  to  convict  anybody;  that  this  course  was  then  taken  to  appease  the  fury 
of  the  public,  and  that  the  judgment  was  allowed  to  stand  for  the  same  reason. 
I  will  not  discuss  this.  But  taking  the  law  as  above  laid  down,  it  was  neces- 
sary under  it  to  prove,  and  that  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  person 
committing  the  violent  deed  had  at  least  heard  or  read  the  advice  given  to  the 
masses,  for  until  he  either  heard  or  read  it  he  did  not  receive  it,  and  if  he  did 
not  receive  it,  he  did  not  commit  the  violent  act  in  pursuance  of  that  advice ; 
and  it  is  here  that  the  case  for  the  State  fails ;  with  all  his  apparent  eagerness 
to  force  conviction  in  court,  and  his  efforts  in  defending  his  course  since  the 
trial,  the  judge,  speaking  on  this  point  in  his  magazine  article,  makes  this 
statement:  "It  is  probably  true  that  Rudolph  Schnaubelt  threw  the  bomb," 
which  statement  is  merely  a  surmise  and  is  all  that  is  known  about  it,  and  is 
certainly  not  sufficient  to  convict  eight  meii  on.  In  fact,  until  the  State  proves 
from  whose  hands  the  bomb  came,  it  is  impossible  to  show  any  connection 
between  the  man  who  threw  it  and  these  defendants. 

It  is  further  shown  that  the  mass  of  matter  contained  in  the  record  and 
quoted  at  length  in  the  judge's  magazine  article,  showing  the  use  of  seditious 
and  incendiary  language,  amounts  to  but  little  when  its  source  is  considered. 
The  two  papers  in  which  articles  appeared  at  intervals  during  years,  were 
obscure  little  sheets,  having  scarcely  any  circulation,  and  the  articles  them- 
selves were  written  at  times  of  great  public  excitement,  when  an  element  in 
the  community  claimed  to  have  been  outraged ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
speeches  made  by  the  defendants  and  others ;  the  apparently  seditious  utter- 
ances were  such  as  are  always  heard  when  men  imagine  that  they  have  been 
wronged,  or  are  excited  or  partially  intoxicated ;  and  the  talk  of  a  gigantic 
Anarchistic  conspiracy  is  not  believed  by  the  then  chief  of  police,  as  will  be 
shown  hereafter,  and  it  is  not  entitled  to  serious  notice,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that,  while  Chicago  had  nearly  a  million  inhabitants,  the  meetings  held  on 
the  lake  front  on  Sundays  during  the  summer,  by  these  agitators,  rarely  had 
fifty  people  present,  and  the  most  of  these  went  from  mere  curiosity,  while 
the  meetings  held  indoors,  during  the  winter,  were  still  smaller.  The  meet- 
ings held  from  time  to  time  by  the  masses  of  the  laboring  people,  must  not 
be  confounded  with  the  meetings  above  named,  although  in  times  of  excite- 
ment and  trouble  much  violent  talk  was  indulged  in  by  irresponsible  parties; 
which  was  forgotten  when  the  excitement  was  over. 

Again,  it  is  shown  here  that  the  bomb  was,  in  all  probability,  thrown  by 
some  one  seeking  personal  revenge ;  that  a  course  had  been  pursued  by  the 
authorities  which  would  naturally  cause  this ;  that  for  a  number  of  years  prior 
to  the  Haymarket  affair  there  had  been  labor  troubles,  and  in  several  cases  a 
number  of  laboring  people,  guilty  of  no  offense,  had  been  shot  down  in  cold 
blood  by  Pinkerton  men,  and  none  of  the  murderers  were  brought  to  justice. 
The  evidence  taken  at  coroners'  inquests  and  presented  here,  shows  that  in  at 


302  ALTGELD  S    REASONS 

least  two  cases  men  were  fired  on  and  killed  when  tlrey  were  running  away, 
and  there  was  consequently  no  occasion  to  shoot,  yet  nobody  was  punished; 
that  in  Chicago  there  had  been  a  number  of  strikes  in  which  some  o-f  the 
police  not  only  took  sides  against  the  men,  tfut  without  any  authority  of  law 
invaded  and  broke  up  peaceable  meetings,  and  in  scores  of  cases  brutally 
clubbed  people  who  were  guilty  of  no  offense  whatever.  Reference  is  made  to 
the  opinion  of  the  late  Judge  McAllister,  in  the  case  of  the  Harmonia  Asfsocia- 
tion  of  Joiners  against  Brenan,  et  al.,  reported  in  the  Chicago  Legal  News. 
Among  other  things,  Judge  McAllister  says: 

"The  facts  established  by  a  large  number  of  witnesses,  and  without  any 
opposing  evidence,  are,  that  this  society,  having  leased  Turner  Hall,  on  Wei^t 
Twelfth  street,  for  the  ptirpose,  held  a  meeting  in  the  forenoon  of  said  day,  in 
said  hall,  composed  of  from  200  to  300  individuals,  most  of  whom  were  jooir- 
neymen  cabinet-makers  engaged  in  the  several  branches  of  the  manufacture 
of  furniture  in  Chicago,  but  some  of  those  in  attendance  were  the  proprietors 
in  that  business,  or  the  delegates  sent  by  them.  The  object  of  the  meeting 
was  to  obtain  a  conference  of  the  journeymen  with  such  proprietors,  or  their 
authorized  delegates,  with  the  view  of  endeavoring  to  secure  an  increase  of 
the  price  or  diminution  of  the  hours  of  labor.  The  attendants  were  wholly 
unarmed,  and  the  meeting  was  perfectly  peaceable  and  orderly,  and  while  the 
people  were  sitting  quietly,  with  their  backs  toward  the  entrance  hall,  with  a 
few  persons  on  the  stage  in  front  of  them,  and  all  engaged  merely  in  the  busi- 
ness fo.r  which  they  had  assembled,  a  force  of  from  fifteen  to  twenty  policemen 
came  suddenly  into  the  hall,  having  a  policeman's  club  in  one  hand  and  a 
revolver  in  the  other,  and  making  no  pause  to  determine  the  actual  character 
of  the  meeting,  they  immediately  shouted:  'Get  out  of  here,  you  damned 
sons-of-bitches,'  and  began  beating  the  people  with  their  clubs,  and  some  of 
them  actually  firing  their  revolvers.  One  young  man  was  shot  through  the 
back  of  the  head  and  killed.  But  to  complete  the  atrocity  of  the  affair  on  the 
part  of  the  officers  engaged  in  it,  when  the  people  hastened  to  make  their 
escape  from  the  assembly  room,  they  found  policemen  stationed  on  either  side 
of  the  stairway  leading  from  the  hall  down  to  the  street,  who  applied  their 
clubs  to  them  as  they  passed,  seemingly  with  all  the  violence  practicable 
under  the  circumstances. 

"Mr.  Jacob  Beiersdorf,  who  was  a  manufacturer  of  furniture,  employing 
some  200  men,  had  been  invited  to  the  meeting  and  came,  but  as  he  was  about 
to  enter  the  place  where  it  was  held,  an  inoffensive  old  man,  doing  nothing 
unlawful,  was  stricken  down  at  his  feet  by  a  policeman's  club. 

"These  general  facts  were  established  by  an  overwhelming  mass  of  testi- 
mony, and  for  the  purpose  of  the  questions  in  the  case,  it  is  needless  to  go 
farther  into  detail. 

"The  chief  political  right  of  the  citizen  in  our  government,  based  upon 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN_,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  303 

the  popular  will  as  regulated  by  law,  is  the  right  of  suffrage,  but  to  that  right 
two  others  are  auxiliary  and  of  almost  equal  importance : 

"First:     The  right  of  free  speech  and  of  a  free  press. 

"Second:  The  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  in  a  peaceable  manner  to 
consult  for  the  common  good. 

"These  are  among  the  fundamental  principles  of  government  and  guar- 
anteed by  our  constitution.  Section  17,  article  2,  of  the  bill  of  rights,  declares : 
'The  people  have  a  right  to  assemble  in  a  peaceable  manner  to  consult  for  the 
common  good,  to  make  known  their  opinions  to  their  representatives,  and 
apply  for  redress  of  grievances.'  Jurists  do  not  regard  these  declarations  of 
the  bill  of  rights  as  creating  or  conferring  the  rights,  but  as  a  guarantee  against 
their  deprivation  or  infringement  by  any  of  the  powers  or  agencies  of  the  gov- 
ernment. The  rights  themselves  are  regarded  as  the  natural  and  inalienable 
rights  belonging  to  every  individual,  or  as  political,  and  based  upon  or  arising 
from  principles  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  a  system  of  free  government. 

"The  right  of  the  people  to  assemble  in  a  peaceable  manner  to  consult  for 
the  common  good,  being  a  constitutional  right,  it  can  be  exercised  and  en- 
joyed within  the  scope  and  the  spirit  of  that  provision  of  the  constitution, 
independently  of  every  other  power  of  the  State  government. 

"Judge  Cooley,  in  his  excellent  work  on  'Torts,'  speaking  (p.  296)  of 
remedies  for  the  invasion  of  political  rights,  says :  'When  a  meeting  for  any 
lawful  purpose  is  actually  called  and  held,  one  who  goes  there  with  the  pur- 
pose to  disturb  and  break  it  up,  and  commits  disorder  to  that  end,  is  a 
trespasser  upon  the  rights  of  those  who,  for  a  time,  have  control  of  the  place 
of  meeting.    If  several  unite  in  the  disorder  it  may  be  a  criminal  riot.' " 

So  much  for  Judge  McAllister. 

Now,  it  is  shown  that  no  attention  was  paid  to  the  judge's  decision;  that 
peaceable  meetings  were  invaded  and  broken  up,  and  inoffensive  people  were 
clubbed ;  that  in  1885  there  was  a  strike  at  the  McCormick  Reaper  Factory, 
on  account  of  a  reduction  of  wages,  and  some  Pinkerton  men,  while  on  their 
way  there,  were  hooted  at  by  some  people  on  the  street,  when  they  fired  into 
the  crowd  and  fatally  wounded  several  people  who  had  taken  no  part  in  any 
disturbance ;  that  four  of  the  Pinkerton  men  were  indicted  for  this  murder  by 
the  grand  jury,  but  that  the  prosecuting  officers  apparently  took  no  interest  in 
the  case,  and  allowed  it  to  be  continued  a  number  of  times,  until  the  witnesses 
were  sworn  out,  and  in  the  end  the  murderers  went  free. 

It  is  shown  that  various  attempts  were  made  to  bring  to  justice  the  men 
who  wore  the  uniform  of  the  law  while  violating  it,  but  all  to  no  avail ;  that  the 
laboring  people  found  the  prisons  always  open  to  receive  them,  but  the  courts 
of  justice  were  practically  closed  to  them ;  that  the  prosecuting  officers  vied 
with  each  other  in  hunting  them  down,  but  were  deaf  to  their  appeals ;  that  in 
the  spring  of  1886  there  were  more  labor  disturbances  in  the  city,  and  particu- 
larly at  the  McCormick  factory;  that  under  the  leadership  of  Capt.  Bonfield 


304  altgeld's  reasons 

the  brutalities  of  the  previous  year  were  even  exceeded.  Some  affidavit  and 
other  evidence  is  offered  on  this  point,  which  I  cannot  give  for  want  of  space. 
It  appears  that  this  was  the  year  of  the  eight  hour  agitation,  and  efforts  were 
made  to  secure  an  eight  hour  day  about  May  i,  and  that  a  number  of  laboring 
men  standing,  not  on  the  street,  but  on  a  vacant  lot,  were  quietly  discussing  the 
situation  in  regard  to  the  movement,  when  suddenly  a  large  body  of  police, 
under  orders  from  Bonfield,  charged  on  them  and  began  to  club  them;  that 
some  of  the  men,  angered  at  the  unprovoked  assault,  at  first  resisted,  but  were 
soon  dispersed ;  that  some  of  the  police  fired  on  the  men  while  they  were  run- 
ning and  wounded  a  large  number  who  were  already  100  feet  or  more  away 
and  were  running  as  fast  as  they  could ;  that  at  least  four  of  the  number  so 
shot  down  died;  that  this  was  wanton  and  unprovoked  murder,  but  there  was 
not  even  so  much  as  an  investigation. 

WAS    IT   AN    ACT   OF   PERSONAL   REVENGE? 

While  some  men  may  tamely  submit  to  being  clubbed  and  seeing  their 
brothers  shot  down,  there  are  some  who  will  resent  it,  and  will  nurture  a 
spirit  of  hatred  and  seek  revenge  for  themselves,  and  the  occurrences  that  pre- 
ceded the  Haymarket  tragedy  indicate  that  the  bomb  was  thrown  by  some  one 
who,  instead  of  acting  on  the  advice  of  anybody,  was  simply  seeking  personal 
revenge  for  having  been  clubbed,  a-nd  that  Capt.  Bonfield  is  the  man  who  is 
really  responsible  for  the  death  of  the  police  officers. 

It  is  also  shown  that  the  character  of  the  Haymarket  meeting  sustains  this 
view.  The  evidence  shows  there  were  only  800  to  1,000  people  present,  and 
that  it  was  a  peaceable  and  orderly  meeting;  that  the  mayor  of  the  city  was 
present  and  saw  nothing  out  of  the  way,  and  that  he  remained  until  the  crowd 
began  to  disperse,  the  meeting  being  practically  over,  and  the  crowd  engaged 
in  dispersing  when  he  left ;  that  had  the  police  remained  away  for  twenty 
minutes  more  there  would  have  been  nobody  left  there,  but  as  soon  as  Bonfield 
had  learned  that  the  mayor  had  left,  he  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to 
have  some  more  people  clubbed,  and  went  up  with  a  detachment  of  police  to 
disperse  the  meeting;  and  that  on  the  appearance  of  the  police  the  bomb  was 
thrown  by  some  unknown  person,  and  several  innocent  and  faithful  officers, 
who  were  simply  obeying  an  uncalled  for  order  of  their  superior,  were  killed.  All 
of  these  facts  tend  to  show  the  improbability  of  the  theory  of  the  prosecution 
that  the  bomb  was  thrown  as  a  result  of  a  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 
ants to  commit  murder;  if  the  theory  of  the  prosecution  were  correct,  there 
would  have  been  many  more  bombs  thrown ;  and  the  fact  that  only  one  was 
thrown  shows  that  it  was  an  act  of  personal  revenge. 

It  is  further  shown  here,  that  much  of  the  evidence  given  at  the  trial  was  a 
pure  fabrication ;  that  some  of  the  prominent  police  officials,  in  their  zeal,  not 
only  terrorized  ignorant  men  by  throwing  them  into  prison  and  threatening 
them  with  torture  if  they  refused  to  swear  to  anything  desired,  but  that  they 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  305 

offered  money  and  employment  to  those  who  would  consent  to  do  this.  Fur- 
ther, that  they  deliberately  planned  to  have  fictitious  conspiracies  formed  in 
order  that  they  might  get  the  glory  of  discovering  them.  In  addition  to  the 
evidence  in  the  record  of  some  witnesses  who  swore  that  they  had  Been  paid 
small  sums  of  money,  etc.,  several  documents  are  here  referred  to. 

First,  an  interview  with  Capt.  Ebersold,  published  in  the  Chicago  Daily 
News,  May  10,  1889. 

CHIEF     OF     POLICE    EBERSOLd's     STATEMENT. 

Ebersold  was  chief  of  the  police  of  Chicago  at  the  time  of  the  Haymarket 
trouble,  and  for  a  long  time  before  and  thereafter,  so  that  he  was  in  a  position 
to  know  what  was  going  on,  and  his  utterances  upon  this  point  are  therefore 
important.     Among  other  things  he  says: 

"It  was  my  policy  to  quiet  matters  down  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  4th  of 
May.    The  general  unsettled  state  of  things  was  an  injury  to  Chicago. 

"On  the  other  hand,  Capt.  Schaack  wanted  to  keep  things  stirring.  He 
wanted  bombs  to  be  found  here,  there,  all  around,  everywhere.  I  thought 
people  would  He  down  and  sleep  better  if  they  were  not  afraid  that  their  homes 
would  be  blown  to  pieces  any  minute.  But  this  man  Schaack,  this  little  boy 
who  must  have  glory  or  his  heart  would  be  broken,  wanted  none  of  that  pol- 
icy. Now,  here  is  something  the  public  does  not  know.  After  we  got  the  An- 
archist societies  broken  up,  Schaack  wanted  to  send  out  men  to  again  organize 
new  societies  right  away.  You  see  what  this  would  do.  He  wanted  to  keep 
the  thing  boiling — keep  himself  prominent  before  the  public.  Well,  I  sat 
down  on  that ;  I  didn't  believe  in  such  work,  and  of  course  Schaack  didn't 
like  it. 

"After  I  heard  all  that,  I  began  to  think  there  was,  perhaps,  not  so  much  to 
all  this  Anarchist  business  as  they  claimed,  and  I  believe  I  was  right.  Schaack 
thinks  he  knew  all  about  those  Anarchists.  Why,  I  knew  more  at  that  time 
than  he  knows  today  about  them.  I  was  following  them  closely.  As  soon  as 
Schaack  began  to  get  some  notoriety,  however,  he  was  spoiled." 

This  is  a  most  important  statement,  when  a  chief  of  police,  who  has  been 
watching  the  Anarchists  closely,  says  that  he  was  convinced  that  there  was  not 
so  much  in  all  their  Anarchist  business  as  was  claimed,  and  that  a  police  cap- 
tain wanted  to  send  out  men  to  have  other  conspiracies  formed,  in  order  to  get 
the  credit  of  discovering  them,  and  keep  the  public  excited;  it  throws  a  flood 
of  light  on  the  whole  situation  and  destroys  the  force  of  much  of  the  testimony 
introduced  at  the  trial. 

For,  if  there  has  been  any  such  extensive  conspiracy  as  the  prosecution 
claims,  the  police  would  have  soon  discovered  it.  No  chief  of  police  could  dis- 
cover a  determination  on  the  part  of  an  individual,  or  even  a  number  of  sepa- 
rate individuals,  to  have  personal  revenge  for  having  been  maltreated,  nor  could 
any  chief  discover  a  determination  by  any  such  individual  to  kill  the  next  police- 


3o6  altgeld's  reasons 

man  who  might  assault  him.  Consequently,  the  fact  that  the  police  did  not 
discover  any  conspiracy  before  the  Haymarket  affair,  shows  almost  conclu- 
sively that  no  such  extensive  combination  could  have  existed. 
*  *  * 
I  will  simply  say  in  conclusion,  on  this  branch  of  the  case,  that  the  facts 
tend  to  show  that  the  bomb  was  thrown  as  an  act  of  personal  revenge,  and  that 
the  prosecution  has  never  discovered  who  threw  it,  and  the  evidence  utterly 
fails  to  show  that  the  man  who  did  throw  it  ever  heard  or  read  a  word  coming 
from  the  defendants ;  consequently  it  fails  to  show  that  he  acted  on  any  advice 
given  by  them.  And  if  he  did  not  act  on  or  hear  any  advice  coming  from  the 
defendants,  either  in  speeches  or  through  the  press,  then  there  was  no  case 
against  them,  even  under  the  law  as  laid  down  by  Judge  Gary. 

FIELDEN    AND    SCHWAB. 

At  the  trial  a  number  of  detectives  and  members  of  the  police  swore  that 
the  defendant,  Fielden,  at  the  Haymarket  meeting,  made  threats  to  kill,  urging 
his  hearers  to  do  their  duty  as  he  would  do  his,  just  as  the  policemen  were 
coming  up ;  and  one  policeman  swears  that  Fielden  drew  a  revolver  and  fired  at 
the  police  while  he  was  standing  on  the  wagon  and  before  the  bomb  was 
thrown,  while  some  of  the  others  testified  that  he  first  climbed  down  off  the 
wagon  and  fired  while  standing  by  a  wheel.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  proven 
by  a  number  of  witnesses,  and  by  facts  and  circumstances,  that  this  evidence 
must  be  absolutely  untrue.  A  number  of  newspaper  reporters,  who  testified  on 
the  part  of  the  State,  said  that  they  were  standing  near  Fielden — much  nearer 
than  the  police  were — and  heard  all  that  was  said  and  saw  what  was  done ; 
that  they  had  been  sent  there  for  that  purpose,  and  that  Fielden  did  not  make 
any  such  threats  as  the  police  swore  to,  and  that  he  did  not  use  a  revolver.  A 
number  of  other  men  who  were  near,  too,  and  some  of  them  on  the  wagon  on 
which  Fielden  stood  at  the  time,  swear  to  the  same  thing.  Fielden  himself 
swears  that  he  did  not  make  any  such  threats  as  the  police  swore  to,  and  fur- 
ther, that  he  never  had  or  used  a  revolver  in  his  life.  But  if  there  were  any 
doubt  about  the  fact  that  the  evidence  charging  Fielden  with  having  used  a 
revolver  as  unworthy  of  credit,  it  is  removed  by  Judge  Gary  and  State's  Attor- 
ney Grinnell.  On  November  8,  1887,  when  the  question  of  commuting  the  death 
sentence  as  to  Fielden  was  before  the  governor,  Judge  Gary  wrote  a  long  letter 
in  regard  to  the  case  in  which,  in  speaking  of  Fielden,  he,  among  other  things, 
says :  "There  is  in  the  nature  and  private  character  of  the  man  a  love  of  jus- 
tice, an  impatience  at  undeserved  sufferings.  *  *  *  *  In  his  own  private 
life  he  was  the  honest,  industrious  and  peaceful  laboring  man.  In  what  he 
said  in  court  before  sentence  he  was  respectful  and  decorous.  His  language 
and  conduct  since  have  been  irreproachable.  As  there  is  no  evidence  that  he 
knew  of  any  preparation  to  do  the  specific  act  of  throwing  the  bomb  that  killed 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN,  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  3O7 

Degan,  he  does  not  understand  even  now  that  general  advice  to  large  masses 
to  do  violence  makes  him  responsible  for  the  violence  done  by  reason  of  that 
advice.  *  *  *  In  short,  he  was  more  a  misguided  enthusiast  than  a 
criminal  conscious  of  the  horrible  nature  and  effect  of  his  teachings  and  of  his 
responsibility  therefor." 

The  State's  attorney  appended  the  foregoing  letter,  beginning  as  follows: 
"While  endorsing  and  approving  the  foregoing  statement  by  Judge  Gary,  I 
wish  to  add  thereto  the  suggestion,  *  *  *  that  Schwab's  conduct  during  the 
trial,  and  when  addressing  the  court  before  sentence,  like  Fielden's,  was  decor- 
ous, respectful  to  the  law  and  commendable.  *  *  *  It  is  further  my  desire 
to  say  that  I  believe  that  Schwab  was  the  pliant,  weak  tool  of  a  stronger  will 
and  more  designing  persons.     Schwab  seems  to  be  friendless." 

If  what  Judge  Gary  says  about  Fielden  is  true ;  if  Fielden  has  "a  natural 
love  of  justice  and  in  his  private  life  was  the  honest,  industrious  and  peaceable 
laboring  man,"  then  Fielden's  testimony  is  entitled  to  credit,  and  when  he  says 
that  he  did  not  do  the  things  the  police  charge  him  with  doing,  and  that  he 
never  had  or  used  a  revolver  in  his  life,  it  is  probably  true,  especially  as  he  was 
corroborated  by  a  number  of  creditable  and  disinterested  witnesses. 

Again,  if  Fielden  did  the  things  the  police  charged  him  with  doing,  if  he 
fired  on  them  as  they  swear,  then  be  was  not  a  mere  misguided  enthusiast,  who 
was  to  be  held  only  for  the  consequences  of  his  teachings ;  and  if  either  Judge 
Gary  or  State's  Attorney  Grinnell  had  placed  any  reliance  on  the  evidence  of 
the  police  on  this  point,  they  would  have  written  a  different  kind  of  a  letter  to 
the  then  executive. 

In  the  fall  of  1887,  a  number  of  the  most  prominent  business  men  of  Chi- 
cago met  to  consult  whether  or  not  to  ask  executive  clemency  for  any  of  the 
condemned  men.  Mr.  Grinnell  was  present  and  made  a  speech,  in  which,  in  re- 
ferring to  this  evidence,  he  said  that  he  had  serious  doubts  whether  Fielden 
had  a  revolver  on  that  occasion,  or  whether  indeed  Fielden  ever  had  one. 

Yet,  in  arguing  the  case  before  the  Supreme  Court,  the  previous  spring, 
much  stress  was  placed  by  the  State  on  the  evidence  relating  to  what  Fielden 
did  at  the  Haymarket  meeting,  and  that  court  was  misled  into  attaching  great 
importance  to  it. 

It  is  now  clear  that  there  is  no  case  made  out  against  Fielden  for  anything 
he  did  on  that  night,  and,  as  heretofore  shown,  in  order  to  hold  him  and  the 
other  defendants  for  the  consequences  and  effects  of  having  given  pernicious 
and  criminal  advice  to  large  masses  to  commit  violence,  whether  orally,  in 
speeches,  or  in  print,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  person  committing  the  vio- 
lence had  read  or  heard  the  advice  :  for,  until  he  had  heard  or  read  it,  he  did 
not  receive  it  and  if  he  never  received  the  advice,  it  cannot  be  said  that  he 
acted  en  it. 


3o8  altgeld's  reasons 

state's  attorney  on   neebe's   innocence. 


At  the  conclusion  of  the  evidence  for  the  State,  the  Hon.  Carter  H.  Harri- 
son, then  mayor  of  Chicago,  and  F.  S.Winston,  then  corporation  counsel  for  Chi- 
cago, were  in  the  court  room  and  had  a  conversation  with  Mr.  Grinnell,  the 
State's  attorney,  in  regard  to  the  evidence  against  Neebe,  in  which  conversa- 
tion, according  to  Mr.  Harrison  and  Mr.  Winston,  the  State's  attorney  said 
that  he  did  not  think  he  had  a  case  against  Neebe,  and  that  he  wanted  to  dis- 
miss him,  but  was  dissuaded  from  doing  so  by  his  associate  attorneys,  who 
feared  that  such  a  step  might  influence  the  jury  in  favor  of  the  other  de- 
fendants. 

Mr.  Harrison,  in  a  letter  among  other  things,  said :  "I  was  present  in  the 
court  room  when  the  State  closed  its  case.  The  attorney  for  Neebe  moved  his 
discharge  on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  hold  him  on.  The 
State's  attorney,  Mr.  Julius  S.  Grinnell,  and  Mr,  Fred  S.  Winston,  corporation 
counsel  for  the  city,  and  myseff,  were  in  earnest  conversation  when  the  motion 
was  made.  Mr.  Grinnell  stated  to  us  that  he  did  not  think  there  was  sufficient 
testimony  to  convfct  Neebe.  I  thereupon  earnestly  advised  him,  as  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  State,  to  dismiss  the  case  as  to  Neebe,  and,  if  I  remember 
rightly,  he  was  seriously  thinking  of  doing  so,  but,  on  consultation  with  his  as- 
sistants, and  on  their  advice,  he  determined  not  to  do  so,  lest  it  would  have  an 
injurious  effect  on  the  case  as  against  the  other  prisoners.  *  *  *  *  I 
took  the  position  that  such  discharge,  being  clearly  justified  by  the  testimony, 
would  not  prejudice  the  case  as  to  the  others." 

Mr.  Winston  adds  the  following  to  Mr.  Harrison's  letter : 

March  21,  1889. 

I  concur  in  the  statement  of  Mr.  Harrison ;  I  never  believed  there  was  suf- 
ficient evidence  to  convict  Mr.  Neebe,  and  so  stated  during  the  trial. 

F.  S.  Winston. 

In  January,  iSgo,  Mr.  Grinnell  wrote  a  letter  to  Gov.  Fifer,  denying  that 
he  had  ever  made  any  such  statement  as  that  mentioned  by  Mr.  Harrison  and 
Mr.  Winston ;  also  that  he  did  believe  Neebe  guilty ;  that  Mr.  Harrison  sug- 
gested the  dismissal  of  the  case  as  to  Neebe ;  and  further,  that  he  would  not 
have  been  surprised  if  Mr.  Harrison  had  made  a  similar  suggestion  as  to 
others,  and  then  he  says :  "I  said  to  Mr.  Harrison  at  that  time,  substantially, 
that  I  was  afraid  that  the  jury  might  not  think  the  testimony  presented  in  the 
case  sufficient  to  convict  Neebe,  but  that  it  was  in  their  province  to  pass 
upon  it." 

Now,  if  the  statement  of  Messrs.  Harrison  and  Winston  is  true,  then  Grin- 
nell should  not  have  allowed  Neebe  to  be  sent  to  the  penitentiary,  and  even  if 
we  assume  that  both  Mr.  Harrison  and  Mr.  Winston  are  mistaken,  and  that 
Mr.  Grinnell  simply  used  the  language  he  now  says  he  used,  then  the  case 


FOR  PARDONING  FIELDEN^  NEEBE  AND  SCHWAB.  309 

must  have  seemed  very  weak  to  him.  If,  with  a  jury  prejudiced  to  start  with, 
a  judge  pressing  for  conviction,  and  amid  the  almost  irresistible  fury  with 
which  the  trial  was  conducted,  he  still  was  afraid  the  jury  might  not  think 
the  testimony  in  the  case  was  sufficient  to  convict  Neebe,  then  the  testimony 
must  have  seemed  very  weak  to  him,  no  matter  what  he  may  now  protest 
about  it. 

When  the  motion  to  dismiss  the  case  as  to  Neebe  was  made,  defendants' 
counsel  asked  that  the  jury  might  be  permitted  to  retire  while  the  motion  was 
being  argued,  but  the  court  refused  to  permit  this,  and  kept  the  jury  present 
where  it  could  hear  all  that  the  court  had  to  say ;  then  when  the  argument  on 
the  motion  was  begun  by  defendants'  counsel,  the  court  did  not  wait  to  hear 
from  the  attorneys  for  the  State,  but  at  once  proceeded  to  argue  the  points 
itself  with  the  attorneys  for  the  defendants,  so  that  while  the  attorney  for  the 
State  made  no  argument  on  the  motion,  twenty-five  pages  of  the  record  are 
filled  with  the  colloquy  or  sparring  that  took  place  between  the  court  and  the 
counsel  for  the  defendants,  the  court  in  the  presence  of  the  jury  making  insin- 
uations as  to  what  inference  might  be  drawn  by  the  jury  from  the  fact  that 
Neebe  owned  a  little  stock  in  a  paper  called  the  Arbeiter-Zeitung  and  had 
been  seen  there,  although  he  took  no  part  in  the  management  until  after  the 
Haymarket  troubles,  it  appearing  that  the  Arbeiter-Zeitung  had  published 
some  very  seditious  articles,  with  which,  however,  Neebe  had  nothing  to  do. 
Finally  one  of  the  counsel  for  the  defendants  said :  "I  expected  that  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  State  might  say  something,  but  as  your  honor  saves  them 
that  trouble,  you  will  excuse  me  if  I  reply  briefly  to  the  suggestions  you  have 
made."  Some  other  remarks  were  made  by  the  court,  seriously  affecting  the 
whole  case  and  prejudicial  to  the  defendants,  and  then  referring  to  Neebe,  the 
court  said : 

"Whether  he  had  anything  to  do  with  the  dissemination  of  advice  to  com- 
mit murder  is,  I  think,  a  debatable  question  which  the  jury  ought  to  pass  on." 
Finally  the  motion  was  overruled.  Now,  with  all  the  eagerness  shown  by  the 
court  to  convict  Neebe,  it  must  have  regarded  the  evidence  against  him  as 
very  weak,  otherwise  it  would  not  have  made  this  admission,  for  if  it  was  a 
debatable  question  whether  the  evidence  tended  to  show  guilt,  then  that  evi- 
dence must  have  been  far  from  being  conclusive  upon  the  question  as  to 
whether  he  was  actually  guilty;  this  being  so,  the  verdict  should  not  have  been 
allowed  to  stand,  because  the  law  requires  that  a  man  shall  be  proven  to  be 
guilty  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  before  he  can  be  convicted  of  criminal  of- 
fense. I  have  examined  all  of  the  evidence  against  Neebe  with  care,  and  it  ut- 
terly fails  to  prove  even  the  shadow  of  a  case  against  him.  Some  of  the  other 
defendants  were  guilty  of  using  seditious  language,  but  even  this  cannot  be 
said  of  Neebe. 


3IO  ALTGELD  S    REASONS 

PREJUDICE   OR    SUBSERVIENCY   OF    JUDGEw 


It  is  further  charged,  with  much  bitterness,  by  those  who  speak  for  the  pris- 
oners, that  the  record  of  this  case  shows  that  the  judge  conducted  the  trial 
with  malicious  ferocity,  and  forced  eight  men  to  be  tried  together;  that  in 
cross-examining  the  State's  witnesses,  he  confined  counsel  to  the  specific  points 
touched  on  by  the  State,  while  in  the  cross-examination  of  the  defendants' 
witnesses  he  permitted  the  State's  Attorney  to  go  into  all  manner  of  subjects 
entirely  foreign  to  the  matters  on  which  the  witnesses  were  examined  in  chief; 
also,  that  every  ruling  throughout  the  long  trial  on  any  contested  point,  was 
in  favor  of  the  State ;  and  further,  that  page  after  page  of  the  record  contains 
insinuating  remarks  of  the  judge,  made  in  the  hearing  of  the  jury,  and  with 
the  evident  intent  of  bringing  the  jury  to  his  way  of  thinking;  that  these 
speeches,  coming  from  the  court,  were  much  more  damaging  than  any  speeches 
from  the  State's  Attorney  could  possibly  have  been;  that  the  State's  Attorney 
often  took  his  cue  from  the  judge's  remarks;  that  the  judge's  magazine  article 
recently  published,  although  written  nearly  six  years  after  the  trial,  is  yet  full 
of  venom ;  that,  pretending  to  simply  review  the  case,  he  had  to  drag  into  his 
article  a  letter  written  by  an  excited  woman  to  a  newspaper  after  the  trial  was 
over,  and  which  therefore  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  case,  and  was  put  into 
the  article  simply  to  create  a  prejudice  against  the  woman,  as  well  as  against 
the  dead  and  the  living ;  and  that,  not  content  with  this,  he,  in  the  same  article, 
makes  an  insinuating  attack  on  one  of  the  lawyers  for  the  defense,  not  for  any- 
thing done  at  the  trial,  but  because  more  than  a  year  after  the  trial,  when 
some  of  the  defendants  had  been  hung,  he  ventured  to  express  a  few  kind,  if 
erroneous,  sentiments  over  the  graves  of  his  dead  clients,  whom  he  at  least  be- 
lieved to  be  innocent.  It  is  urged  that  such  ferocity  of  subserviency  is  with- 
out a  parallel  in  all  history;  that  even  Jeffries  in  England,  contented  himself 
■With  hanging  his  victims,  and  did  not  stoop  to  berate  them  after  death. 

These  charges  are  of  a  personal  character,  and  while  they  seem  to  be  sus- 
tained by  the  record  of  the  trial  and  the  papers  before  me,  and  tend  to  show 
the  trial  was  not  fair,  I  do  not  care  to  discuss  this  feature  of  the  case  any  far- 
ther, because  it  is  not  necessary.  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  clearly  my  duty 
to  act  in  this  case  for  the  reasons  already  given,  and  I,  therefore,  grant  an 
absolute  pardon  to  Samuel  Fielden,  Oscar  Neebe,  and  Michael  Schwab,  this 
26th  day  of  June,  1893.  John  P.  Altgeld. 

Governor  of  Illinois. 


HX 


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|3|  II 

n  n 

I  Life  of  Albert  R.  Parsons  i 

(THIRD  EDITION.)  i 


m 
Containing    his    editorials,    speeches,    auto    biography      H 

and  much  other  interesting  matter.     Price  ^1.50,  postage      |j 

I5c.  i 


LUCY  E.  PARSONS 

(his  widow) 
PUBLISHER 

3130  N.  Troy  Street  Chicago  III.     | 

ailllglgiaiSlllSlllllHiigigigiiisiigiiiiiiSgiiiiaiiagiigiHjigisiigigiHiiiiaiasiiis 

The  Famous  Speeches 

of  the  Chicago  Anarchists  | 

When  asked  if  they  had  anything 
to  say  why  sentence  of  death 
should  not  be  passed  upon  them, 
delivered  in  court,  October,  7,  8, 9, 
1886— 6th  Edition.  Price  30  cents. 

POSTAGE  5  CENTS 

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3130  N.  Troy  Street  Chicago,  111.     i 


